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Abstract 
This paper shows some empirical results for the collective labor supply of 
households in thirteen developed countries (USA, UK, Australia, Canada, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Russia, Japan, and China). 
I have reviewed a significant number of papers in order to aggregate information 
for future investigations. Among the conclusions obtained are a gender 
differential in labor supply when the household includes a child, and a greater 
level of female household production. This analysis shows that gender 
differences observed in other literature persist throughout the consulted 
literature. 
Keywords: Household, collective model, gender differences, labor supply, 
household production, family taxation. 
JEL Codes: D10, J22, Y10  
1. Introduction 
The household is probably the most important economic unit (Becker, 1991; 
Molina, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015). Specifically, household labor supply issues 
are the subject of both academic and economic approachesd (García et al., 1998, 
1999, 2001, 2010, 2011; Gimenez et al., 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020). Initially, 
economists specified unitary models, supposing a common structure of 
preferences between members of the household. In spite of being an important 
new step for Microeconomics, unitary models had several flaws: they did not 
adequately represent the bargaining process, nor the existence of multiple 
preferences (linked to more than one utility function). 
Some years after the first unitary models were proposed, collective models 
appeared (Chiappori, 1988, 1990, 1992; Donni et al., 20..) that established the 
importance of different preferences between household members. More than 
one utility function, along with constraint equations, presented a new challenge, 
which is resolved through optimization techniques. In collective models, 
spouses (or other household members) can bargain in order to reach the Pareto-
optimal situation.  
The paper examines the principal results found in the literature of household 
labor supply in collective models for developed countries. Practically all the 
papers showed that unitary models could be statistically rejected, reflecting a 
multi-individual criterion of the decision-making process in households. 
Another constant among countries is gender differences, especially in the 
degree of bargaining power and the extent of labor supply. Our goal is for this 
paper to act as a consulting document for those who would like to understand 
the empirical results of collective models in a range of countries. 
2. Evidence by country 
UK 
There is an extensive literature based on household bargaining and its 
consequences for labor supply in the UK. We can study trends in marriage 
bargaining and their effects on different variables related to labor supply 
Many papers point to significant gender differences in labor supply; for example 
in total work hours, with this differential being greater than the gap observed in 
other countries (for example, Denmark), which allows UK women to spend 
more time in childcare activities than their European counterparts. 
Other papers show that female labor supply may depend on the husband’s wage, 
even if he is unemployed, showing the effects of marginal utility in marriage. 
Furthermore, women’s labor supply is more affected than that of men by the 
spouse’s unearned income. For example, if the man has an economic income, 
the negative effect on the woman’s labor supply is greater than if the situation 
were reversed. 
Such gender differences in households are closely related to bargaining power. 
To explain these differences, the literature points to such factors as a lower 
education level, the age gap (between spouses), the woman’s unearned income, 
the difference in investments between the spouses, and living in London (which 
enhances women’s bargaining power). In other words, educational, financial, 
and physical variables can all have effects on the labor supply of women. 
In terms of the relationship between the public sector and childcare activity in 
the UK, it is clear from the literature that child benefits received by the main 
carer increases her bargaining power. 
Even when there exists a significant gap between men and woman in marriage, 
it is important to acknowledge that the disparities were greater in the past. 
Women work’s situation has improved in recent decades, as has been shown by 
various authors. This evolution is related to an augmentation of married 
women’s wages, which obviously has had an effect on the bargaining power of 
women in marriage. 
Nevertheless, this augmentation has led to some changes in the mechanism of 
bargaining in marriage. Some authors point to increases in women’s wages 
causing increases in transaction costs, and giving rise to decisions similar to 
non-cooperative solutions, which are closely related to increases in women’s 
bargaining power. The majority of consulted papers point to the unitary model 
being statistically rejected, which implies that decision-making processes are 
based on bargaining. 
Australia 
Another Anglo-Saxon country studied in this work is Australia. We find in the 
consulted papers that the presence of children in the household appears to make 
women’s total hours of work (market and domestic) greater than that of men, 
which implies fewer hours of leisure for women. This is not to say that 
Australian women work more market hours than do British women, but that 
they do have more total work hours, including housework. 
The presence of pre-school children also changes the time allocations of parents 
and their consumption in the household. This could be a consequence of the 
childcare needs of pre-school children, as well as of financial and time 
constraints.  
How to reduce these costs is studied by Apps and Rees (2010), who argue that 
a basic family tax system with support for childcare could reduce childcaring 
costs. 
USA  
The US is unique in many ways, so we begin by studying women’s labor supply. 
The consulted papers point to an increase of the gender ratio has reduced 
American women’s labor supply in a significant way, while other gender 
variables have played an important role. For instance, divorce laws favorable to 
women have reduced women’s labor supply and increased the labor supply of 
men. This has a close relationship with bargaining power. When women are 
more empowered, their labor supply should increase, but, surprisingly, it seems 
that empowerment reduces women’s labor supply! 
There are other variables that could affect the labor supply of both men and 
women. For example, an inheritance received is found to have a negative effect 
on both male and female labor supply, similarly to a health shock (being ill for 
a considerable period) which also reduces labor supply. 
Other variables affect both-sex labor supply. Regarding childcare and its 
effects, some authors have found that the presence of children under age 6 
reduces the wife’s labor supply and increases that of the husband. 
Nevertheless, not all papers find the same or, at least, they qualify these results. 
In fact, by studying the mother’s first birth, certain authors have found that baby 
boys have no impact on mother work’s hours (compared with baby girls) but 
increase her total work. 
The consulted papers find substitution and income effects are equal for both 
men and women, noting that income increases have no effect on labor supply 
(a null income effect). In terms of domestic production, the more one spouse 
earns, the less he/she is involved in domestic production. Also, the wife’s share 
tends to increase with a higher wage of her partner, which illustrates the 
importance of wages (by direct and cross effects on labor supply). 
From the household bargaining perspective, we can see that the unitary model 
is rejected in the bulk of the consulted papers. Most of the authors point out that 
collective models fit better then unitary ones. Some studies find that an optimal 
specialization between spouses exists: the husbands tend to work more hours in 
market-labor, while the wife spends more time in non-market-labor. 
Furthermore, it is found that, in most households, the man is the one who 
establishes dictatorial preferences. 
Canada 
In most of the consulted works, collective models fit better with the data. This 
is not seen in some papers on Canada, where the collective model is rejected (in 
the consulted literature) in the case of young couples when the sample includes 
households with pre-school children. Nevertheless, the Collective Rational 
Caring Agents Hypothesis is not rejected, which implies a certain level of 
collectiveness in the modelling. 
Studying wage effects, it is found that an increase in the wage of one spouse of 
a young couple reduces the cash transference to the partner. This situation could 
be a generational behavior, because the effect is not observed for older couples, 
where the effect is just opposite. 
 
Asia (China and Japan) 
Our data and papers on Asian countries includes Siow (2008) on Famine in 
Sichuan, China. The author studies the marriage market in two periods, showing 
preferences between men and women living in couples, all from a theoretical 
perspective. 
In Japan, it is found that spouses’ labor supply attempts to smooth shocks for 
each other, in order to maintain a life-level income. This is demonstrated by the 
estimation of a wage-shock effect on labor supply, specifying a collective model 
with a sharing rule, taking into account non-participation.  
Other papers also show that there are inter-city differences in household 
behavior. Specifically, finding difference between cities in terms of resource 
allocation in households in Japan. 
Mediterranean countries 
Mediterranean countries are different from other OECD countries. They have 
social links between them, which differentiate them from the others. Family and 
social structure play an important role in the countries of southern Europe, 
which is reflected in household decisions. 
For Spain, the available data tend to a rejection of the unitary model, but also a 
rejection of the collective model. Nevertheless, the latter is perhaps not a 
trueejection of collective models, but a more concrete kind of egoistic 
preferences. This shows the importance of taking into account different kinds 
of preferences for households. 
Italy is a Mediterranean country where we find that female labor participation 
is positively influenced by age, level of education, and the husband’s 
occupation. Having children and the lack of help from a relative could 
discourage women from entering the labor market. Quality of available formal 
childcare has a positive effect on women`s labor supply. 
France 
The French literature on household decisions shows that when working time 
constraints are specified, the preferences of both married and single individuals 
are similar, which could allow us to examine the utility and labor supply 
differentials. An increase in the husband’s salary improves women’s resource 
allocation, showing cross-effects of wages in French households, but the 
opposite is not necessarily true: a woman’s wages do not have this effect on her 
spouse’s resource allocations. 
When we look at non-participation in the job market, we find some differences 
in the sharing rule of households, which are related to this topic. 
Netherlands: 
In general, the unitary models are rejected in the consulted literature for 
households in the Netherlands. 
In terms of labor supply, it is found that male labor supply elasticity does not 
show a high sensitivity to either spouse. In the case of women, estimations show 
that their elasticities tend to be more stables over time. It appears that cross and 
direct effects of salary and labor supply in men does not equally affect both 
husband and wife. Nevertheless, studies find positive effects for married men’s 
labor supply when the wife’s wage increases, showing a positive cross-effect of 
women’s salary.   
When a man’s wage increases, an increase of his working hours is found (higher 
substitution effect), along with his consumption. This also leads to a decrease 
in men’s work at home and childcare time, which is offset by extra time for the 
woman. 
From the perspective of children, it is found that increasing the mother’s salaries 
(empowering) increases the utility of the children. 
Germany 
In the consulted literature for German households, the unitary model is rejected, 
reflecting the importance of considering collective-decision models. One of the 
consulted works shows a model that considers a tax reform, allowing for the 
rejection of unitary models 
The other consulted paper considers the effects of the French family-splitting 
mechanism on German families, studying fiscal effects and changes in 
behaviour. The paper shows that the effects of splitting are null in most cases.  
Belgium 
  
One consulted paper for Belgium establishes a model, concretely a collective-
discrete model, which takes into account female labor supply and intra-
household allocations. It also considers the possibility of non-participation 
(which implies a possible null-labor supply) and taxes, which allows us to show 
their effects. What is observed is that there is just one group affected by tax 
reform; certain married women change their labor supply. 
The other paper consulted attempts to explain a collective labor supply in 
households where there are children, and takes into account childcare 
expenditures and their later effects on labor supply. The model establishes that 
parents must decide between leisure, childcare, and working time, with 
subsequent restrictions and utility functions. 
Russia 
We have consulted just one paper for Russia, which specifies a model to 
consider inequality between spouses and marriages. The authors find evidence 
for both satisfaction and utility. 
Another factor in this paper is the difference between the countries shown 
before and after economies in transition. Russia shows patterns more similar to 
those of western countries in the past (i.e., a greater gap in decisions between 
men and women), and the relationship between income and well-being is 
different in those kinds of economies. 
 
3. Conclusions 
After introducing the main results by country, we are now able to draw some 
general conclusions about collective labor supply. Throughout this paper, we 
have shown up different results for household behavior models in different 
countries. Despite this, there are some common factors seen in most of the 
developed countries. 
Specifically, practically all papers show that unitary models could be 
statistically rejected, reflecting multi-individual criteria of the decision-making 
process in households. Another constant among countries is gender 
differentials, especially in respect of bargaining power and labor supply. 
Bargaining power has been seen to have certain variables, such as gender ratio, 
age difference between spouses, non-salary incomes, and education level, all of 
which can have an empowering effect on women. On the other hand, a lower 
educational level and lower wages could lead to lower bargaining power for 
women. As a surprising conclusion, there are some studies showing that an 
increase in the bargaining power of women does not necessarily imply an 
increase of their labor supply, but the opposite: if their bargaining power 
increases, their labor supply is reduced. 
Salary is a key variable in order to understand what takes place in the real world. 
Some consulted studies show that husband’s wages have a discouraging effect 
on wife’s labor supply, but her salary does not affect his supply, which is a sign 
of different behavior within couples. 
Childcare activity is another topic studied in many of the consulted papers. As 
a general rule, the presence of children affects negatively mother’s labor supply. 
This could be related to the relationship between salaries and market price for 
some activities of household production. If women’s salary is lower, 
microeconomic theory says they are the ones who will stay home for childcare, 
especially when children are younger. 
This could be related to another observed issue; tax increases could affect 
female labor supply. This could seem to be an effective cut in salary (which 
could make market work even less attractive) 
Nevertheless, some papers show that, in spite of reducing their labor supply, 
some women increase their total hours of work (by increasing their household 
work hours), showing a difference with men. 
 
 Country Paper  Authors Surveys Main Results 
U.K. (& 
Denmark) 
Household labor supply in 
Britain and Denmark: some 
interpretations using a model 
of Pareto Optimal behavior 
Applied Economics, 2001. 
Tim Barmby & Nina 
Smith 
 Danish 
Longitudinal 
Sample (Den.) 
 FES (U.K.) 
Stronger positive effect in U.K. on female 
valuation of her own nonmarket time than 
Danish’s ones. That makes differences at 
childcare availability 
Greater hour gap at work time by gender in 
U.K.  
U.K. Collective Labour Supply: 
Heterogeneity and Non-
Participation. 
The Review of Economic 
Studies, 2007. 
Richar Blundell, Pierre-
André Chiappori, 
Thierry Magnac and 
Costas Meghir. 
 U.K. Family 
Expenditure 
Survey (FES) 
The female labour supply depends on male 
wage, even if her husband is not working at 
the moment. (Estimate not precise) 
Collective model not rejected. 
 
U.K. The working families’ tax 
credit and some European tax 
reforms in a collective setting 
Economic Household, 2006 
Michal Myck, Olivier 
Bargain, Mieiam Beblo, 
Denis Beninger, 
Richard Blundell, 
Raquel Carrasco María-
Concetta Chiuri, 
François Laisney, 
Valérie Lechene, 
Ernesto Longobardi, 
Nicolas Moreau, Javier 
Ruiz-Castillo, Frederic 
Vermeulen 
 Family 
Resources 
Survey (FRS) 
1998-1999 
Difference in age (man-woman), man’s 2 
levels higher education, having a 0-4 years age 
child, higher woman’s unearned income, 
difference in investment or savings (man-
woman) and Living in London have negative 
effects on man’s bargaining power. 
Man’s education 1 and 2 levels lower, relative 
earning potential (by tax and benefits), 
youngest child between 5 and 10 years and 
difference in wages (man-woman) have a 
positive effect on man’s bargaining power. 
Man’s bargaining power (calibrated and 
estimated) is greater than 0.5 
If benefits are paid to the main childcarer, 
man’s bargaining power is lower than the case 
where benefits are paid to the main earner. 
 
U.K. Household labour supply and 
the marriage market in the 
U.K. 1991-2008 
Marion Goussé. 
Nicolas Jacquemet, 
Jean-Marc Robin 
 Britush 
Household Panel 
Differences in working time due to gender, 
educational and marriage factors. 
Labour Economics, 2017. Survey (1991-
2008) 
Highest increase of married women’s wage in 
the period. 
Gender gap in salaries. 
U.K. The impact of targeting policy 
on spouses’ demand for 
public goods, labor supplies 
and sharing rule. 
Empirical Economics, 2017 
Panayiota Lyssiotou  U.K. child 
benefits. 
 U.K. FES 
The collective model with separable 
preferences over labor and supplies and public 
goods hypothesis is not rejected. 
If wife receives child benefits or investment’s 
income, her bargaining power changes. 
Wife’s hours of market work respond more 
negatively to changes in the household’s 
residual unearned income than husband’s 
ones. 
The higher salary, the more labour supplies 
rise, but less in women’s case. 
U.K. Bargaining versus non-
cooperation; transaction 
costs within marriage 
Applied Economic Letters; 
2001 
Jonathan S. Seaton  U.K. FES 1984 Shows the possibility of isolating inconsistency 
at the same time of measuring transaction costs 
in marriage. 
The rise in female wages could have made 
transaction costs increase, making decisions 
more similar to non-cooperative solutions. 
Australia Family labor supply, taxation 
and saving in an imperfect 
capital market 
Economic Household, 2010 
Patricia Apps, Ray 
Rees 
 Australian Time 
Use Survey. 
(TUS) 
 Australian 
Household 
Expenditure 
Survey (HES) 
When children live at home, total hours of 
market and domestic labor of women are twice 
those of men. Effects on leisure hours are 
coherent with that. 
Pre-school children changes strongly saving, 
time allocation and consumption 
Assumption of perfect capital markets is 
untenable. 
A family-based tax system with support to 
children could help overcome problems caused 
by imperfect capital markets, reducing 
childcaring costs. 
Australia Testing neoclassical and non-
neoclassical models of 
household labour supply 
Applied Economics, 2006 
Akira Kawaguchi   Neoclassical, Wife Secondary Earner are not 
supported under normal conditions.  
Intra-Household Trade model satisfies 
symmetry condition, neither satisfies negative-
definiteness condition for the demand for non-
market time. 
U.S.A. Marriage Market, Divorce 
Legislation and Household 
Labor Supply 
Journal of Political Economy, 
2002 
Pierre-André 
Chiappori, Bernand 
Fortin, Guy Lacroix. 
 University of 
Michigan Panel 
Study of Income 
Dynamics, 
(PSID), 1988 
(interview 1989) 
An increase of the gender ratio reduces 
women’s labor supply in a strong way. 
Unitary model and “separated spheres” models 
are not compatible with results. 
Significative effects of divorce laws with 
different sign for men and women. 
Divorce laws favorable to women seem to 
reduce women labor supply, as they make 
husband labor supply to increase. 
Different effects for single individuals 
Women seem to act in a more altruistic manner 
than their husbands. 
Distribution factors have an important effect on 
household decisions. 
Importance of the state of the marriage. 
U.S.A. The Collective Marriage 
Matching Model: 
Identification, Estimation and 
Testing 
Advanced Econometrics, 
2008 
Eugene Choo, Shannon 
Seitz, Aloysius Siow 
 US Census Data 
2000 
It includes both possibilities: single people or 
married ones. Into married people, it 
distinguish between specialized nor non-
specialized couples. 
In general, the estimates of the collective model 
are more robust in the collective model.  
U.S.A. Commitment in the 
household: Evidence from the 
effect of inheritances on the 
labor supply of older married 
couples. 
Labour Economics, 2016 
David M.Blau, Ryan 
M. Goodstein 
 Health and 
Retirement Study 
(HRS) 
Receiving an inheritance affects negatively 
both women and men labor supplies, being 
very similar to a health’s shock. 
The hypothesis of a efficient contract by 
bargaining household due to a commitment  
prior to an inheritance is rejected in elder 
couples. 
U.S.A Collective decisions, 
household production and 
labor force participation 
Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 2018 
Olivier Donni, 
Eleonora Matteazzi 
 PSID, 2009 They specify a model with labor market no-
participation and domestic production, relaxing 
the assumption of perfect substitutability 
between domestic and market goods. 
If individual’s wage is lower than household 
production’s marginal productivity, the model 
considers this individual as a non-participating 
in labor market. 
Income effect is equal to substitution effect in 
labor supply in both genders (an income 
increase does not affect labor supply). 
An increase in the share of net total expenditure 
is negatively large in women than in men. 
An additional child under 6 years old reduces 
wife’s labor supply and increases husbands’s 
labor supply. 
Wages matter for the domestic production 
division. The more wage a partner earns, the 
less he/she is involved in domestic production. 
They find the wife’s share tends to increase 
with a higher wage of her partner. Gender-ratio 
is positively related to women’s share. 
U.S.A. The Division of Labor by New 
Parents. Does Child Gender 
Matter? 
IZA Discussion Paper Nº 
1787, 2005 
Shelly Lundberg  National 
Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 
(NLSY), 1979 
She studies the specialization in couples 
depending on some variables, as the child’s 
gender, wages, child services…) 
She specifies a two-periods model, which 
attends to earning opportunities in the future. 
By studying the mother’s first birth (son or 
daughter, she finds baby boys have no impact 
on mother work’s hours (compared with baby 
girls) but increase work hours for father, more 
than 60 hours more than baby girls fathers.  
That changes in educational levels are 
considered: if the first birth is a baby boy, more 
educated women tend to work more hours than 
less educated ones. 
That means sons increase specialization among 
less educated couples and reduce it among the 
more educated. 
She finds strong correlations between pre-birth 
wages and hours of work. 
U.S.A. Labor Supply, Wealth 
Dynamics and Marriage 
Decisions 
2014 Meeting Papers 210, 
Society for Economic 
Dynamics 
Maurizio Mazzoco, 
Claudia Ruiz, Shintaro 
Yamaguchi. 
 PSID 1968-1996 The model is cooperative (between spouses), 
which explains the optimality of spouses’ 
specialization: the husband works more hours 
outside and wife does more at home. 
The model tries to explain the evolution of 
female labor supply, but it fails in predicting 
the decline of the female labor supply in the 
two years previous to marriage.  
U.S.A. Kinky choices, dictators and 
split might: a non-cooperative 
model for household 
consumption and labor supply 
IZA Journal of Labor 
Economics, 2014  
Jan Boone, Karen van 
der Wiel, Arthur van 
Soest, Frederic 
Vermeulen 
 Consumer 
Expenditure 
Survey (CEX) 
The paper shows the difference between 
preferences of husband and wife. It uses a non-
cooperative model, based on Nash approach. 
The data shows the father values less than his 
wife the child’s expenditures.  
The husband controls 54% of household, and 
the wife 45%. The way of measuring this is the 
proximity between public goods consumption 
and a spousal preference. 
It is observed that, the more children are in a 
household, the less the wife works. 
Standard unitary model is rejected in favor of a 
collective, non-cooperation model. 
China How does the marriage 
market clear? An empirical 
framework.  
The Canadian Journal of 
Economics 
Aloysius Siow  Famine in 
Sichuan Data 
The paper is focused on marriage market, 
trying to explain the demand and supply of 
different of men and women, and also the 
maximization of household utility in a 
collective specification. It also explains the 
difference in cohorts born in the famine of 
Sichuan. 
It shows a life cycle model which tries to 
explain the marriage market in just two periods. 
Italy Quality Of Demand of Child 
Care and Female Labour 
Supply in Italy. 
Labour Economics, 2000 
Maria Concetta Chiuri  Bank of Italy 
Survey of 
Household 
Income and 
Wealth (SHIW) 
1993 
Female participation is influenced by her age 
and education and by the husband’s occupation 
(white collar worker) in a positive way. 
Having children and the lack of relative’s help 
discourages mother’s labor supply. 
Rationing in local services of childcare affects 
the demand of the household of childcare. 
Quality of formal childcare has a positive effect 
on women’s labor supply. 
France Collective female labour 
supply: Theory and 
application 
The Economics Journal, 2007 
Olivier Donni  Budget des 
Families 
(INSEE), 1984-
1985 
If working time constraints are taken into 
account, the preferences of married and single 
women are similar. 
 
France Estimation of Collective 
Model of Labor Supply with 
Female Nonparticiparion 
Economic Journal 
Jean-Michel Hourriez  European 
Community 
Household 
Pannel. 1994-
2001 
Men who work more hours tend to live with 
women who do the same. 
Increase in men’s wage improves women’s 
allocation. The opposite is not always true. 
Differences in sharing rule in case of non-
participation 
Women scarcity increases their labor supply. 
Canada A test of the unitary and 
collective models of 
household labour supply 
The Economic Journal, 1997. 
Bernard Fortin, Guy 
Lacroix 
 Canadian Census 
of Population 
and Housing. 
1986 
Collective model is rejected in case of young 
couples when the sample includes the pre-
school children 
Collective Rational Caring Agents Hypothesis 
is not rejected. 
An increase wage’s member of a young couple 
reduces his/her transference to his/her partner. 
In case of elder couples, the effect is opposite. 
Canada Sharing within Families: 
Implications for the 
Shelley A. Phipps and 
Peter S. Burton 
 Statistics Canada 
Family 
If most part of household consumption is in 
public goods, distribution problems are minor.  
Measurement of Poverty 
among Individuals in Canada 
The Canadian Journal of  
Economics, 1995 
Expenditure 
Surveys. 
Netherlands An empirical model of 
collective household labor 
supply with non-participation 
The Economic Journal, 2009 
Hans G. Bloemen  The 
 Dutch Socio-
Economic Panel 
1990-2001 
Positive effects in married men labor supply 
when spouse’s wage increases. 
Non-linear effects of wages in men and not in 
women. 
Male labor supply’s elasticity do not show a 
high sensitiveness to either of spouses. 
Women’s elasticities are much more stable 
among estimations, being more sensitive than 
men’s.  
The husband’s share decreases when his wife’s 
increases. 
Non-labor income effects depend on marital 
status. In married couples, those incomes are 
assigned to man, while in non-married couples 
that income is split. 
Netherlands Married with children: A 
Collective Labor Supply 
Model with Detailed Time 
Use and Intrahousehold 
Expenditure Information 
American Economic Review, 
2012. 
Laurens Chechye, 
Bram de Rock, Frederic 
Vermeulen 
 Longitudinal 
Internet Studies 
for the Social 
Sciences 
Leisure is a luxury good. 
Rejection of unitary model. 
A wage increase increases men’s working time, 
consumption of both spouses (less for his wife). 
It also decreases work in the home and 
childcare time, which is offset by the woman. 
Non-linear effects on leisure of woman when 
her own salary increases. 
By increasing mother’s salaries, utility of 
children could be greater. 
Netherlands And the winner is… An 
empirical evaluation of 
unitary and collective labour 
supply models. 
Empirical Economics, 2005 
Frederic Vermeulen  DNB 
Houhsehold 
Syrvey 
This model pretends to model household labor 
supply in a individual and collective 
(bargaining) approaches. 
Unitary model cannot be rejected for single 
individuals, but it is possible to reject for a 
sample of couples. The collective model in the 
same sample also cannot be rejected. 
The author establishes some restrictions as the 
other bibliography (  
Russia Welfare Sharing Within 
Households: Identification 
from Subjective Well-being 
Data and the Collective 
Model of Labor Supply 
Journal of Family and 
Economic Issues 
Natalia Radchenko  Russian 
Longitudinal 
Monitoring 
Survey 
The model focuses on intrahousehold 
inequality, considering sharing rules.  They 
found evidence linking satisfaction with the 
utility function. The paper shows that 
relationship between income and well-being in 
transition economies differs from the western 
ones. 
They found empirical evidence that relative 
bargaining power of each spouse depends on 
the labor income, demographic characteristics 
and household data. 
The data shows lower-income households have 
more equal sharing. 
Wife’s wage benefits both spouses, but 
husband’s wage empowers the husband. 
A difference with bibliography is preschoolers 
seem to impact negatively in the difference 
between the budgets of spouses. 
Germany Welfare Analysis of a Tax 
Reform for Germany: A 
Comparison of the Unitary 
and Collective Models of 
Household Labour Supply. 
Journal of Population 
Economics, 2007. 
 
Denis Beninger, 
François Laisney and 
Miriam Beblo 
 GSOEP 1998 The model considers a tax reform, showing the 
difference between the specification of a 
unitary model and a collective one. 
The unitary model reflects a low percentage of 
the real facts, showing the importance of taking 
into account the collective structure of the 
households.  
Germany Family Tax Splitting: A 
Microsimulation of its 
Potential Labour Supply and 
Denis Beninger, 
François Laisney and 
Miriam Beblo 
 GSOEP 1998 The paper supposes the effect of the French 
family splitting mechanism in German 
families. 
Intra-Household Welfare 
Effects in Germany,  
Centre for European 
Economic Research, 2003 
The effects of the splitting is null in most cases, 
and has positive effects only in wealthy 
families. 
If we consider family splitting, we can see the 
positive effects just in higher income families, 
especially in wives.  
The results are studied by describing the 
German situation. 
Belgium A collective model for female 
labour supply with non-
participation and taxation 
Journal of Population 
Economics, 2006. 
Frederic Vermeulen  Socio-Economic 
Panel of the 
Center for Social 
Policy. 
The model specified is a collective discrete-
choice model for female labour supply, which 
takes into account intra-household allocation. It 
also considers the possibility of no 
participation and taxes. 
A very small group of married women change 
their labor supply after the tax reform in 2001. 
Belgium Collective Labor Supply and 
Child Care Expenditures: 
Theory and Application 
Journal of Labor Research, 
2012. 
Chris Van Klaveren, 
Joris Ghysels 
 Flemish Families 
and Care Survey 
2004-2005 
This paper focuses on collective labor supply in 
household with children, and the childcare 
expenditures and their effects on labor supply. 
It considers parents have leisure, childcare and 
worktime. 
Japan Wage shocks, household 
labor supply and income 
instability 
Journal of Population 
Economics, 2014 
Sisi Zhang  Survey of 
Income and 
Program 
Participation, 
2004 
The paper focuses on therelationship between 
labor supply of a spouse with a shock to the 
wage of the other. It tries to study if spouses’s 
labor supply tries to smooth the other’s wage 
shocks. 
The model of reference is a collective model, 
sharing-rule type, where shocks (permanent or 
transitory) are considered. It also considers 
labor market non-participation. 
Evidence shows that wife’s labor supply 
smooths a shock in husband’s wage. 
 
Japan Intra-household interaction in 
a nuclear family: A utlity-
maximizing approach. 
Transportation Research, 
2009 
Hironoru Kato, Manabu 
Matsumoto. 
 Toyama and 
Tokyo Data 
The paper tries to explain the household joint 
resource allocation, comparing the 
intrahousehold interactions between different 
cities, revealing differences and similitudes 
between them. Childcare activities are also 
taken into account. 
Spain Estimation and testing of 
household labour supply 
models: evidence from Spain. 
CEMFI Investigaciones 
económicas, 2009 
Laura Crespo  
 
 ECHP 1994-
1999 
The unitary model is rejected with the data and 
specification. The collective model is rejected, 
but this is more likely to reject egoistic 
preferences. What this shows is that a unitary 
model cannot explain the real facts, and the 
non-unitary model must take into account the 
non-egoistic preferences. 
The author concludes that, in the sample, the 
non-distribution factors hypothesis can be 
rejected 
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